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INTRODUCTION

Texas now leads the country in the enactment of important criminal
justice reforms that have reduced incarceration while providing more effective
crime control.' This fact may startle those who understandably regard Texas as
a strictly "law and order" jurisdiction with harsh punishments and little regard

for due process. 2 The state's steadfast embrace of the death penalty tends to
convey that image.3 For many years, Texas also led the way in mass
incarceration.4 However, state legislators have worked steadily for almost 10
years adopting important innovations that have reduced the prison population

and encouraged rehabilitation. 5 Beginning in 2007, the state's efforts cut its
incarceration rate by 11%,6 resulting in the closures of several prisons. 7 It has
made similar strides in lowering the juvenile incarceration rate as well, reducing
the juvenile prison population by 48% from 2007 to 2010.8

1
See infra note 5; see also Editorial Board, Texas Leads the Way in Needed CriminalJustice
Reforms, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/texas-leads-theway-in-needed-criminal-justice-reforms/2014/01/28/83919b72-879d- 1le3-916eeO1 534ble1 32_story.html.
2
In fact, a more nuanced view suggests that Texas has long balanced harsh punishment with
greater procedural protections in a number of areas. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Is Texas
Tough on Crime but Soft on Criminal Procedure?,49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31 (2012) (discussing
comparatively progressive Texas rules regarding jury trial rights, prosecutorial (but not defense)
discovery requirements, defendant choice of judge or jury sentencing, protections in custodial
interrogations, a broad exclusionary rule, and other procedural protections).
3
Id. at 33-36 (discussing state's reputation for harsh punishments due to being the "capital
of capital punishment").
4

Id. at 36-38.

Texas's success in reducing incarceration caught the attention of the national media in 2014.
See, e.g., Editorial Board, A Rare Opportunity on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/opinion/sunday/a-rare-opportunity-on-criminal-justice.html
(noting that federal reforms are based on those begun in Texas which have been emulated in many
states as well); Martha T. Moore, Conservatives, Liberals Unite to Cut Prison Population,USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/16/conservativessentencing-reform/6396537/; Olivia Nuzzi, Prison Reform is Bigger in Texas, DAILY BEAST (Apr.
12,
2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/12/prison-reform-is-bigger-intexas.html (addressing sentencing reform in criminal and juvenile law); Reid Wilson, Tough Texas
Gets Results by Going Softer on Crime, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/11/27/tough-texas-gets-results-bygoing-softer-on-crime/.
6
See Moore, supra note 5.
7
See Danny Kruger, Why Texas is Closing Prisons in Favour ofRehab, BBC MAG. (Dec. 1,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30275026 (discussing Texas closure of three
prisons due to reduced prison population brought about by increased drug rehabilitation for
offenders).
8
The legislature changed sentencing policy in the juvenile system in similar fashion, leading
to a dramatic decrease in the incarceration rate of juveniles from 2007 to 2011. See CHILDREN AT
5
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A variety of circumstances coalesced to bring about these recent tectonic
shifts in the Texas criminal justice landscape. Many credit the desire of state
legislators to control criminal justice spending. 9 Others point to a certain
straightforward practicality in the state's culture that made it amenable to
evidence-based approaches for addressing root causes.10 Either way, the notion
of saving taxpayer dollars by decreasing the state's reliance on incarceration by
turning to less expensive and more effective strategies for crime control, such as
rehabilitative programs, seems to have carried the day.
This Article addresses another area of criminal justice reform in which
the state has made great strides: reforms designed to prevent wrongful
convictions, chief among them being innovations in state oversight and
regulation of the practice of forensic science. Here, the politics of reform have
unfolded quite differently. The dramatic reforms adopted by the legislature to
prevent wrongful convictions, as is true of most reforms of this nature, are driven
more by the need to maintain the public's faith in the integrity of the criminal
justice system than by any desire to save money.'1 In a state that firmly supports
the imposition of the death penalty, it is critical that its citizens believe in the
fairness and accuracy of the criminal process. Wrongful convictions, especially
in death penalty cases, deeply offend principles of moral decency. Forensic
science scandals that undermine the legitimacy of murder convictions quickly
threaten the capital punishment regime and the legitimacy of the entire criminal
justice system. When news reports revealed the deep problems lurking in the
Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory circa 2002, it did not take long for

RISK, THE STATE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS: A ROADMAP TO IMPROVED OUTCOMES IN THE
TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, ADULT CERTIFICATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH 14-16

http://childrenatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/01 The-State-of-Juvenile(2013),
Justice.pdf (sponsored by the Texas Bar Foundation).
9
See Editorial Board, supra note 1.
See Kruger, supra note 7 (discussing how the state's "straightforward moral outlook" once
10
led to tough criminal justice policy but has now shifted to more effective policy and crediting the
state's "fiscal conservatism" for contributing to the shift); Wilson, supra note 5 (crediting the
legislature's consultations with Tony Fabelo, an expert on evidence-based criminal justice policies,
for shift to rehabilitative model of punishment). Fabelo is the Research Director for the Council of
State Governments Justice Center which provides technical assistance to state and local
governments to make efficient use of government resources in setting justice policies. For Dr.
Fabelo's professional biography, see Staff, JUSTICE CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/aboutjc/staff/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
11 For example, the presiding officer of the first legislatively-created advisory panel to address
wrongful convictions in the state viewed the legislation creating the advisory panel as a reflection
of the state's commitment to "honor, integrity, and fairness." See TIMOTHY COLE ADVISORY PANEL
ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, REPORT TO THE TEXAS TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE iv (2010)
[hereinafter TCAP REPORT], http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/25663/FTNALTCAPreport.pdf. As
he explained, "The State of Texas is obviously concerned about wrongful convictions. Justice must
be meted out fairly or it loses all meaning .... Our interest lies in serving justice fairly and
effectively to ensure the integrity of the rule of law." Id.
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city and state leaders to call for a moratorium on the imposition of death
sentences based on testimony by the laboratory's analysts.12
This Article surveys the important reforms adopted by the Texas
legislature to advance the quality of forensic science that form what we call the
"infrastructure" of forensic science in the state. In all, the legislature put into
place six key components that now form the Texas forensic science
infrastructure: (1) the Texas Forensic Science Commission;13 (2) the Texas
Criminal Justice Integrity Unit (a stakeholder committee that hosts discussion
meetings and training programs);14 (3) the Michael Morton Act, which instituted
expansive prosecutorial disclosure from pre-plea to post-conviction; 15 (4) the
"junk science" writ, a habeas petition that allows challenges to the forensic
science used to obtain a conviction if new evidence undermines the validity of
the evidence; 16 (5) the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs, a statewide public
defender for habeas petitions; 17 and (6) state laws requiring the preservation and
testing of biological evidence.' 8
The Article also describes two local innovations that have transformed
the roles each institution plays in the criminal justice system and have become
national models. The first innovation emerged from the shambles of the scandalridden Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory in the early 2000s.' 9 In
2014, the Houston Forensic Science Center took over the laboratory's operations
under the supervision of a board of directors consisting of community
volunteers.2" The Dallas County District Attorney's Office originated the second
innovation by establishing the country's first Conviction Integrity Unit in 2007.21
Prosecutors who work in the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit ("CIU"),
as well as those in the other CIUs now established in the state's other large cities,
play important leadership roles in shaping state policies to prevent wrongful
convictions and advance the practice of forensic science.22 Moreover, both of
these local innovations have transformed the cultures in their respective

12

See

SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, Cops IN LABORATORY COATS: CURBING WRONGFUL

CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES 207 (Carolina Acad. Press 2015).
13
14
15
16
17

See infra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-115 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 182-224 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 182-224 and accompanying text.

18
19
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institutions from highly adversarial to ones that embrace collaboration with the
defense bar.23
While largely descriptive, the Article aims to provide some guidance for
lawmakers in other states grappling with exonerations and crime laboratory
scandals. With the experience of having observed the operation of the
infrastructure for several years, we also draw some lessons about the challenges
the state faces in the future.
II. THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

The story about how Texas came to lead the nation in criminal justice
reforms has many leading figures. However, to understand why Texas-of all
states-has adopted more reforms to prevent wrongful convictions than any
other, one has to mention the avalanche of negative headlines from 2002 to 2009
surrounding two separate problems: (1) the Houston Police Department Crime
Laboratory 24 and (2) the controversial execution of Cameron Todd Willingham,
including Texas Governor Rick Perry's decision not to grant his request for a
stay of execution.2 5 While the two situations were unrelated, they both laid bare
the shoddy forensic science that supported many criminal convictions, and they
both generated bad press at roughly the same time.2 6
The problems in the Houston Police Department ('HPD") Crime
Laboratory came first, beginning in 2002, when news reports exposed its
deplorable conditions.27 Two years later, in 2004, a man named George
Rodriguez walked out of prison after serving 17 years behind bars for a rape he
did not commit. 28 Rodriguez became the first of several high-profile exonerations
in which HPD Crime Laboratory analysts were found to have given invalid

See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Worst Crime Lab in the Country--Or Is Houston Typical?, N.Y.
24
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2003), http://truthinjustice.org/suttonDNA.htm; Nick Madigan, Houston's
Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/09/us/houston-s-troubled-dna-crime-lab-faces-growing23

scrutiny.html?_r=0; Houston Crime Lab Only ReportedProsecutionFriendlyEvidence, GRITS FOR
BREAKFAST (Apr. 30, 2009), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2009/04/houston-crime-lab-

only-reported.html.
See David Grann, Trial by Fire?Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept.
25
7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire.
The Houston Police Department Crime Lab scandal broke out in 2002, but it continued
26
unabated until 2011. See Liptak, supra note 24; Madigan, supra note 24. The publicity over
Cameron Todd Willingham's execution started in 2004. See infra note 40.
27
See THOMPSON, supranote 12, at 1-33 (discussing the discovery of problems at the Houston
Police Department Crime Laboratory and how invalid forensic evidence led to George Rodriguez's
wrongful conviction).
28

Id.
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scientific testimony.2 9 The widespread and serious nature of the problems in the
laboratory led one auditor to conclude that the Houston laboratory was "the
paradigmatic example of a failed forensic agency., 30 From the initial reports in
2002 until at least 2008, the Houston laboratory continued to generate scathing
news stories. 31
At about the same time that the HPD Crime Laboratory scandal unfolded
in the early 2000s, Cameron Todd Willingham' s death penalty case was reaching
the end.32 Willingham, a white man from Corsicana, Texas, had been convicted
of capital murder by arson of his three young daughters who died in a house fire
on a cold December morning, two days before Christmas, in 1991. 3 ' His
conviction rested on the testimony of two arson investigators as well as that of a
jailhouse informant.34
After all of Willingham's appeals had been exhausted, his courtappointed attorney asked Gerald Hurst, a leading fire investigator and fire
scientist, to search for new evidence to include in a clemency petition. 35 In
reviewing the evidence from Willingham's trial, Hurst determined that the arson
investigators' testimony was based on invalid fire science and that the fire was
most likely accidental. 36 Willingham filed a petition seeking clemency based on
this new scientific evidence, which was unanimously denied by the Texas Board
of Pardons and Parole.3 7 Willingham's lawyer then sought a stay of execution
from Governor Perry, providing the same scientific proof that Willingham's
conviction had been secured through invalid forensic testimony. On
Willingham's scheduled execution date, February 17, 2004, the governor denied
the stay of execution "based on the facts of the case., 38 Willingham was
executed. He had begged his parents to never stop trying to vindicate him.39
News stories after Willingham's death caused many to believe that
Texas had executed an innocent man, and Governor Perry's decision to deny his

29

Id.

Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictionsand Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime
Labs, 86 N.C.L. REV. 163, 187-88 (quoting Michael R. Bromwich, the Independent Investigator
30

hired by the City of Houston to conduct an audit of the HPD Crime Laboratory in the wake of news
reports of problems in the laboratory).
31
See THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 205-11.
32
See Liptak, supra note 24; Madigan, supra note 24.
33

See Grann, supra note 25.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.
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petition for a stay of execution gained notoriety.4" Whether Willingham was
innocent or not, it is clear that the ostensible "scientific" evidence in his case was
patently incorrect and not based on valid scientific principles. (Years after his
execution, the jailhouse informant would recant, and other evidence came to light
that the prosecutor in Willingham's case had withheld exculpatory evidence,
further intensifying doubts about his guilt.)4 1
Thus, in 2004, two important cases made headlines. That year, George
Rodriguez was exonerated, bringing calls from two successive HPD Police
Chiefs, the city's mayor, and other public officials for a moratorium on
executions in cases involving evidence produced by the HPD Crime
Laboratory.42 This was the same year in which Willingham was executed, almost
immediately raising questions about whether bad forensic science had caused a
wrongful execution.4 3 Following these scandals, state lawmakers enacted
legislation that would dramatically improve the practice of forensic science and
its use by the courts.44
By 2005, the movement to prevent wrongful convictions took hold in the
state and has not diminished to date. The legislature, as well as leaders in the
state's larger cities, has made paradigm-shifting changes in the administration of
criminal justice generally, and especially in the area of forensic science. We will
discuss each reform affecting forensic science in turn.
A.

The Texas ForensicScience Commission

In 2005, a year after Willingham's execution and Rodriguez's
exoneration, the Texas legislature created the Texas Forensic Science
Commission ("TFSC").45 The TFSC, which adopted the motto "Justice through
Science," plays a critical role in regulating the practice of forensic science in the
Soon after his execution, news reports began to question the validity of his conviction. See
Steven Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on DisprovedForensics, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9,2004),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0412090169dec09-story.html.
The full
story appeared several years later in the New Yorker magazine article, see Grann, supra note 25,
which was followed by other reports by national news outlets. See, e.g., Texas May Have Executed
Innocent
Man,
NPR
(Sept.
2,
2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 112488253; Death by Fire, PBS (Oct. 19,
40

2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/death-by-fire/etc/introduction.html.
41
See Tom Dart, Texas Prosecutor Accused of Misconduct for Role in Famous Execution
Case, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/19/texasprosecutor-accused-misconduct-execution-case; Maurice Possley, A Dad was Executedfor Deaths
of His 3 Girls. Now a Letter Casts More Doubt., WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/letter-from-witness-casts-ftrther-doubt-on-2004-texasexecution/2015/03/09/d9ebdab8-c45 1-11 e4-ad5c-3b8ce89flb89_story.html.
42
See THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 207.
43 See Mills & Possley, supra note 40.
44 See infra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
45

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 (West 2005).
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state. Only two other states in the country, New York and Delaware, have similar
but those commissions have considerably
commissions with statewide reach,
46
narrower authority than the TFSC.
The TFSC consists of seven scientists, five drawn from the faculties of
the state's public universities, two forensic scientists, and two attorneys, one who
is a prosecutor and the other a defense attorney.47 By law, the prosecutor must be
chosen from a list of 10 candidates submitted by the Texas District and County
Attorneys Association, and the defense attorney must be selected from a list of
10 submitted by the Texas Criminal Defense Attorneys Association.48 The
Governor appoints the chair and three members, the Lieutenant Governor
appoints three members, and Attorney General appoints two members.4 9
The TFSC has been granted broad power to ensure the integrity of the
evidence produced in the state's crime laboratories. 50 Its enabling legislation
grants the TFSC the authority to investigate allegations of "professional
New York's commission only has authority to accredit laboratories. See Commission on
46
SERVS.,
JUST.
Div.
CRIM.
ST.
N.Y.
Science,
Forensic
http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/pio/boards/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Delaware also has
a commission that is charged with providing "oversight and guidance," but it does not appear to be
having as much success in fostering reform. See Forensic Science Commission, ST. DEL.,
http://dshs.delaware.gov/forensics/forensic-science.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2016); see also
Michael

Hall,

False

Impressions,

TEX.

MONTHLY

(Jan.

2016)

www.texasmonthly.com/articles/false-impressions/ (noting that the TFSC has had more success at
bringing about reforms than similar commissions in New York and Delaware). California had a
forensic science task force, but it is now defunct. See AN EXAMINATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE IN

2009),
(Nov.
FORCE
TASK
LAB.
REV.
CRIME
CAL.
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/crime-labs-report.pdf Other states such
as Virginia and North Carolina have advisory boards for their State Forensic Laboratories. The
North Carolina advisory board provides advice and makes recommendations, but it does not have
investigative authority, nor does it oversee the accreditation of laboratories or the certification of
analysts. See Forensic Advisory Board, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ncdoj.gov/AboutDOJ/Crime-Lab/Forensic-Advisory-Board.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). The Virginia Forensic
Science Board has broader authority, but its authority is limited to the laboratories operated by the
CALIFORNIA,

state, not local police crime laboratories. See Forensic Science Board,VA. DEP'T OF FORENSIC SCI.,

http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/about-dfs/forensic-science-board/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
47

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 3(a) (West 2015).

48

Id. § 3(a)(2), (3).

49

Id. §3.

50
The question of the Commission's jurisdiction became an issue in 2009 when the group
planned to hold hearings to investigate the arson testimony used in Cameron Todd Willingham's
case. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. For an account of the controversy surrounding
this issue, see The Texas Forensic Science Commission and the Willingham Case, INNOCENCE
14,
2010), http://www.innocenceproj ect.org/the-texas-forensic-sciencePROJECT (Sept.
commission-and-the-willingham-case/; Hall, supra note 46. In the end, the Commission was
prohibited from investigating "'specific items of evidence that were tested or offered into evidence
prior to' September 1, 2005." The Texas ForensicScience Commission and the Willingham Case,
supra; see also Hall, supra note 46 (noting that the TFSC's "first case," the Willingham case,
"nearly destroyed" the TFSC).
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negligence or professional misconduct that would substantially affect the
integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by an accredited
laboratory., 51 To this end, the TFSC requires all forensic laboratories to selfreport any error or irregularity that might affect the integrity of a laboratory test.
Any employee or person from outside of the organization may report a laboratory
issue to the TFSC anonymously as well. 52 The TFSC will ensure that laboratories
implement corrective actions when appropriate in the wake of a reported
incident.5 3
The TFSC's first investigation of professional negligence involved a
complaint filed by the Innocence Project challenging the forensic evidence
offered to convict Cameron Todd Willingham. 54 On the eve of the TFSC's
scheduled hearing, Governor Perry suddenly "fired" the chairman and two
members of the TFSC and then appointed a prosecutor as chairman, who then
effectively scuttled the investigation into the Willingham case.55
Despite the controversy, the TFSC ultimately released a report
discrediting the arson indicators used by fire investigators to convict Willingham
and others.56 The report did not consider whether the arson investigators had
engaged in professional misconduct or negligence, as it was not clear whether
the Commission had the authority to pursue such an investigation.57 Rather, the
2011 report suggested 17 reforms to bring arson investigations into accord with
modem science, and recommended that old arson convictions be reviewed.58
Later that same year, the Texas Attorney General ruled that the TFSC
did not have jurisdiction to review evidence that was tested or offered in court

51

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4(a)(3) (West 2015).
The requirement to report problematic incidents to the TFSC flows from standards for
accreditation that laboratories must maintain, as reported by Lynn Garcia, General Counsel for the
TFSC, in a telephone conversation with co-author Thompson on Aug. 18, 2016.
53
This reporting process operates under the Commission's authority to investigate complaints
of professional negligence or malfeasance. TEX. CODE CIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4(a)(1)-(2) (West
2015).
54
See James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas: Governor Fires Chairman of Forensic Science
Committee, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l0/01/us/OlbrfsGOVERNORFIREBRF.html?_r-0; Matt Smith & Ed Lavandera, Perry 'Squashed' Texas
Execution
Probe,
Ex-official
Says,
CNN
(Sept.
8,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/201l/POLITICS/09/07/texas.execution.probe/.
55
McKinley, supra note 54; Smith & Lavandera, supra note 54.
56
McKinley, supra note 54; Smith & Lavandera, supra note 54. For a more detailed analysis
of the Willingham case, see Grann, supra note 25.
52

57

See TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION:

WILLINGHAM/WILLIS

INVESTIGATION

5-7

(2011),

http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf.
58
See id. at 39-52.
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59
before 2005, the year the Commission was established. Thus, the Willingham
report had considered the scientific validity of the arson indicators without
running afoul of the jurisdictional limitation outlined in the Attorney General's
ruling. Although the future of the TFSC seemed to hang in the balance during
these early years, ultimately the TFSC regained its footing and has grown in
statutory authority and community stature ever since.
The TFSC's most important role is to regulate forensic laboratories by
60
overseeing the state requirement that all forensic laboratories be accredited. As
of June 2015, the legislature transferred the authority to accredit laboratories to
the TFSC from the Department of Public Safety, the state's police agency. It is
critical that this function was removed from the organizational control of the state
police and placed in the control of an organization independent of law
61
enforcement that is directed by academic scientists.

In addition, a new requirement will mandate that all laboratory analysts
as of 2019 be individually licensed in their disciplines. 62 The TFSC is charged
with establishing qualifications for licensing including "(a) successful
completion of education requirements; (b) specific coursework and experience,
including instruction in courtroom testimony and ethics; (c) successful
completion of an examination required or recognized by the commission; and (d)
successful completion of proficiency testing to the extent required for crime
laboratory accreditation. ,63 Since 2015, this program has been guided by an
one
advisory board of seven forensic scientists, one defense attorney, and
64
organizations.
professional
state
respective
their
prosecutor, selected by
Through the TFSC's oversight of laboratory protocols and analyst
qualifications, the TFSC has raised the overall quality of forensic science
statewide. The TFSC also holds stakeholder conferences and training

59 See Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Tex., to The Honorable Nizam Peerwani,
2011),
29,
(July
Comm'n
Sci.
Forensic
Tex.
Officer,
Presiding
2
https://texasattomeygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/ 0 11ihtrnga-0866.htm.
The legislature transferred the authority to oversee laboratory accreditation from the
60
Department of Public Safety, the state's law enforcement agency, to the TFSC, making it
independent of law enforcement. See Texas Forensic Science Commission Crime Laboratory
Accreditation Program, TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.texas.gov/texas-forensic-

science-commission-crime-laboratory-accreditation-program (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
61

See THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 193-97 (discussing the importance of independence from

law enforcement organizations to promote rigor in the accreditation process for crime laboratories).
62

See Texas Forensic Science Commission Forensic Analyst Licensing Program, TEX.

FORENSIC ScI. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.texas.gov/texas-forensic-science-commission-forensic-

analyst-licensing-program (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
63

Id.

64

Id.
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programs,65 and participates in those held by other state organizations.66 TFSC
representatives also participate at the national level in forensic science reform.67
The TFSC has also recommended against the use of one type of junk
science in the state, which sets a precedent for its examination of other types in
the future. In 2016, the TFSC recommended that bite mark evidence not be
admitted in criminal cases until the techniques used are demonstrated to be
reliable and valid.68 Furthermore, the TFSC has facilitated important systemic
reviews of past convictions when it has been discovered that a type of forensic
evidence was unreliable.69
B. The Texas CriminalJustice Integrity Unit
In 2008, Judge Barbara Hervey of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
formed an ad hoc group called the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit (TCJIU),
under the auspices of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 70 The group's goals are "to
review the strengths and weaknesses of the Texas criminal justice system" and
"to bring about meaningful reform through education, training, and legislative
recommendations., 71 The group has studied the causes of wrongful convictions,
such as eyewitness identification practices, interrogations, and inadequate
defense representation.7 2

65
2015),

See generallyTEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (Nov. 2014-Nov.
[hereinafter

FOURTH

ANNUAL

REPORT]

http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/2015%20FSC%2OAnnual%2OReport
%20Posted%20Smaller%20Size.pdf.
66
The authors have attended meetings and symposia at which the General Counsel of the
TFSC has spoken, such as a stakeholders meeting of the Texas Conviction Integrity Unit held in
2015.
67
See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 65, at 25. The presiding officer of the TFSC, Dr.
Vincent J. Di Maio, currently serves on the National Forensic Science Commission ("NFSC"), one
of two members from Texas. The other Texas member of the NFSC is Judge Barbara Hervey, the
founder and Chair of the Texas Conviction Integrity Unit. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying
text.
68

See TEX. FORENSIC Sci. COMM'N, FORENSIC BITEMARK COMPARISON COMPLAINT FILED BY

15-16
(2016), http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/FinalBiteMarkReport.pdf; see also Hall, supra
note 46.
69
See infra Part III.
NATIONAL INNOCENCE PROJECT ON BEHALF OF STEVEN MARK CHANEY-FINAL REPORT

70

See Welcome to the Texas CriminalJustice Integrity Unit, TEX. JUD. BRANCH CT. OF CRIM.

APP., http://www.txcourts.gov/cca/texas-criminal-justice-integrity-unit.aspx (last visited Nov. 3,
2016). Judge Hervey also serves as one of the state's two representatives on the National Forensic
Science Commission. See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 65.

71

See Welcome to the Texas CriminalJustice Integrity Unit, supra note 70.
2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, TEX. CRIM. JUST. INTEGRITY
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/253235/tcjiu-2009-report.pdf.
72
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With respect to forensic science, the group has undertaken to "reform[]
the standards for collection, preservation, and storage of evidence" and
"improve[] crime lab reliability. 7 3 To that end, in 2009 the TCJIU surveyed state
judges regarding their reactions to the National Academy of Sciences report,
StrengtheningForensic Science in the UnitedStates, A Path Forward(the "NAS
Report"), which was published in the same year.74 The survey showed that state
judges did not feel sufficiently educated in forensic science and the standards for
admissibility.7 5 Responding to that desire, the TCJIU has held judicial training
programs, in conjunction with the TFSC.7 6
The TCJIU has also convened stakeholders' meetings to discuss
concerns related to forensic science. One such meeting included a presentation
by the TFSC's General Counsel regarding the need to undertake a massive
review of convictions involving DNA mixture evidence.77 Although the FBI
notified all laboratories about potential mixture analysis issues in May of 2015,
to date, Texas is the only state that has undertaken such a review.7
C. The Michael Morton Act Adopts BroadProsecutorialDiscovery
In 2009, the legislature built on the growing criminal justice reform
momentum by creating a stakeholder group, including judges, legal experts,
legislators, and law enforcement representatives, to advise the Texas Indigent
Defense Commission regarding the causes of wrongful convictions and
suggestions for preventing wrongful convictions. 79 The group, known as the
Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions ("TCAP"), was named
for a Lubbock man who had been wrongly convicted and who had died of an
asthma attack while incarcerated.80 Cole, a 26-year old African-American Army

73

Id.

74

Id.; see also

COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT'L RES.

(2009)
[hereinafter NAS REPORT].
75 Id. at 26-28.
76 For a list of past training programs and meetings, see TCJIUMeetings, TEX. JUD. BRANCH
CT. CRiM. App., http://www.txcourts.gov/cca/texas-criminal-justice-integrity-unit/meetings.aspx
(last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
77 Both of the authors attended this meeting. For a discussion of the DNA mixtures review,
see infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
78
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD

79
The Executive Director of the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (formerly known as the
Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense) served as the TCAP's presiding officer and the
Commission's staff supported TCAP's work with research drafting and report production. See
TCAP REPORT, supra note 11; TIMOTHY COLE ADVISORY PANEL ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
RESEARCH DETAILS (2010), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/25674/FINALTCAPresearch.pdf.
80
See Timothy Cole, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/timothycole/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Co-author Thompson was a member of the advisory panel.
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veteran, was enrolled at Texas Tech University when he was wrongly identified
as a serial rapist dubbed the "Tech rapist.",81 Convicted on the basis of erroneous
eyewitness testimony and false forensic testimony, he had served 23 years of a
25-year sentence for rape when he died in prison of an asthma attack. 82 A court
posthumously exonerated him on April 7, 2009, and Governor Perry pardoned
him on March 1, 2010.83
In 2010, the TCAP recommended six legislative reforms, two of which
came to form part of the forensic science infrastructure: prosecutorial disclosure
The TCAP identified prosecutorial
requirements and the "junk science" writ.84ThTC
discovery as a means of reducing wrongful convictions. At the time, the state's
discovery law severely restricted a defendant's access to the prosecution's
evidence. 85 To access records, documents, or other evidence contained in
prosecution files, criminal defendants were statutorily required to obtain a court
order based on a showing of good cause.86 Even then, the statute specifically
excluded written witness statements and documents considered work product,
such as police and laboratory reports, from pre-trial discovery.87 Although many
Texas district and county attorneys had voluntarily implemented open-file
policies by 2013, the scope of discovery available under those policies varied
from county to county and from prosecutor to prosecutor.88 As a result, a
defendant's ability to obtain information from the State differed based on where
the arrest occurred and who was assigned to prosecute the case. 89
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.
See TCAP REPORT, supra note 11, at 30-31. For a discussion of the "junk science" writ, see
infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text. The report also led to the adoption of a state-of-the art
model policy on eyewitness identification and a requirement that police departments should adopt
guidelines that comply with the model policy. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.20, § 3(b) (2011);
84

MODEL

POLICY

ON

EYEWITNESS

IDENTIFICATION,

http://www.lemitonline.org/publications/documents/ewid final.pdf.
85

See generally TEX. DEF. SERV. & TEX. APPLESEED, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL

CASES INTEXAS: How BEST PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE (2013) [hereinafter 2013
DISCOVERY REPORT], http://texasdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/tds-report.pdf (concluding that

the Texas criminal discovery statute as it existed in 2013 did not comport with American Bar
Association standards adopted in most other states).
86
See id. at 8 (setting out text of former TEXAS CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 39.14 (current version
at TEX. CODE CRAM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015))).
87
Id.; see also Brem v. State, 571 S.W. 2d 314, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that
police reports were exempt from pre-trial discovery under former Art. 39.14 as work product). Of
course, investigative reports that contained exculpatory material were nevertheless subject to
disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See, e.g., Exparte Miles, 359 S.W.
3d 647, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that investigative reports exempt from statutory
discovery should have been disclosed because they contained exculpatory evidence).
88

See 2013 DISCOVERY REPORT, supra note 85, at 5.

89

Id.
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The TCAP report alone was not sufficient, however, to bring about the
needed reform. It also took two highly publicized exonerations in 2010 and 2011,

respectively, both involving Texas prosecutors who withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,09 to jolt the Texas legislature into
taking action. 91 One of those cases involved a white man named Michael Morton,
who had spent almost 25 years in prison for the murder of his wife, before DNA
testing both established his innocence and identified his wife's real killer. 92 An
investigation by the Innocence Project revealed that the prosecutor in that case,
Ken Anderson, had failed to produce significant evidence of Morton's innocence
both to the defense and the trial judge.93 Anderson, who had since become a
district judge, ultimately resigned his position, surrendered his law license and

pleaded guilty to criminal contempt charges for withholding evidence in the
Morton case. 94 He was sentenced to serve 10 days in jail, pay a $500 fine, and
perform 500 hours of community service.95
In 2013, state lawmakers enacted the Michael Morton Act (the "Morton
Act"), which created a state-wide open-file discovery policy that took effect in
January 2014.96 Morton's wrongful conviction had highlighted a fundamental
weakness of the Brady doctrine: under Brady, prosecutors enjoy wide discretion
to determine whether specific pieces of evidence qualify as exculpatory such that
90
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to disclose "evidence favorable to an
accused ... where the evidence was material to guilt or punishment").
91
These were the wrongful convictions of an African-American, Anthony Graves, and
Michael Morton. For a brief description of the two cases, see TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV.,
TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE: THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT'S FIRST YEAR 5-7 (2015)

http://texasdefender.org/wpACT
REPORT],
MORTON
[hereinafter
content/uploads/TowardsMoreTransparentJustice.pdf.
92
See Brandi Grissom, An ExonerationAfter Decades,and a Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/austin-man-found-guilty-in-killing-of-exoneratedmans-wife.html?_r-0. After Morton's release, Mark Norwood was convicted of Christine
Morton's murder and indicted in the 1988 death of another Austin woman. Id.; see also Brandi
Grissom, Mark Norwood Indicted in Second Murder, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 9, 2012),
https://www.texastribune.org/2012/11/09/mark-norwood-faces-grand-jury-second-austinmurder/.
93
See Brandi Grissom, Michael Morton 's Conviction Comes to Define Anderson, TEX. TRIB.
(Feb. 3, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/02/03/tough-crime-prosecutor-set-rare-courtinquiry.
94
See Jordan Smith, FormerDA Anderson Pleads Guilty to Withholding Evidence in Morton
Case, AUSTIN CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2013-1108/former-da-anderson-pleads-guilty-to-withholding-evidence-in-morton-case/.
95
Id. Anderson served only five days of his prison sentence; county officials said he was
released early for good behavior. See Claire Osborn, How Ken Anderson was ReleasedAfter Only
Five Days in Jail, STATESMAN (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/kenanderson-released-from-williamson-county-jail/nbtKN/.
96
Michael Morton Act, S.B. 1611, 2013 Leg., 83rd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2014),
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=SB 1611; 2013 Tex.
Gen. Laws 106 (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015)).
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they must be disclosed to the defense.9 7 The Morton Act did away with this
prosecutorial discretion, mandating that the State must produce "as soon as
practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant" almost all
relevant, non-privileged information about a case that is in the State's possession
or control. 98 Entities under contract with the State, such as forensics laboratories,
99
for example, are considered to be part of the State for discovery purposes. In
particular, the statute requires production of police incident reports as well as
written and recorded witness statements, "including witness statements of law
enforcement officers"'°°-items that had been considered exempt from
discovery under prior law.' 0 1 And while the Morton Act allows prosecutors to
release a document in redacted form, defense counsel must be notified of the
redaction, and can request that a court determine whether the redaction was
justified." 2
Subsection (h) of the Morton Act codifies the prosecution's duties under
Brady, stating that the State must disclose to the defendant any "exculpatory,
impeachment, or mitigating" information that "tends to negate the guilt of the
charged."10 3
defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense
Importantly, Subsection (k) of the Morton Act takes this one step further by
imposing an ongoing duty on the State to disclose Brady material without a
request from the defense, even post-conviction. That subsection mandates that
the State "promptly" disclose any newly obtained Brady material to the
04
defendant or the court, whether it is discovered "before, during, or after trial."'
Since the passage of the Morton Act, Texas prosecutors and defense
counsel have faced some challenges regarding implementation of the Act's
provisions. 0 5 The broad discovery requirement was intended to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct, but it also affected the practice of forensic science by

97

See, e.g., TEX. SENATE RESEARCH CTR., AUTHOR'S/SPONSOR'S STATEMENT OF INTENT, S.B.

(2013),
Sess.
Reg.
83rd
Leg.,
2013
1611,
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/html/SBO1611F.htm (stating that "Brady is
vague and open to interpretation, resulting in different levels of discovery across different counties
in Texas").
98
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2015).
99
100

Id.
Id.

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
TEX. CODE CRM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(c) (West 2015).
103 Id. art. 39.14(h).
Id. art. 39.14(k).
104
See generally MORTON ACT REPORT, supra note 91 (noting issues encountered during the
105
Morton Act's first year of implementation, including instances of improper redactions or
withholding of documents, discovery delays, and confusion among law enforcement officers
regarding what they are required to provide to prosecutors under the Act).
101
102
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imposing new disclosure obligations on forensic laboratories. 106 This has resulted
in a need for Morton Act training among crime lab personnel, as well as concern
regarding allocating the costs of complying with the Act's discovery
requirements.1" 7 Nevertheless, Texas's criminal discovery statute, which had
been one of the least robust in the country, is now considered a model for other
states, as well as a step forward on the path to criminal justice reform.1" 8
It is worth noting as well that the legislature also significantly
strengthened the enforcement of prosecutorial disclosure when, in 2013, it
extended the statute of limitations for exonerees to file a grievance with the state
bar against prosecutors who engage in misconduct. 10 9 Under the prior law,
complaints had to be filed within four years of when the prosecutor engaged in
the misconduct, or when concealed misconduct was discovered or should have
been discovered.110 The new law, which was also enacted in response to the
Morton exoneration, l l provides that the four-year limitations period does not
12
begin until the day the wrongly convicted individual is released from prison.,
As a result, Texas death row exoneree Anthony Graves-who served more than
18 years in prison before being cleared of capital murder' 13-was able to file a
complaint against the prosecutor who withheld evidence in his case, resulting in
an unprecedented disbarment.1 14 The Morton Act, considered along with the
strengthened enforcement of disclosure requirements and extended time for
grievances to be filed against prosecutors who suppress evidence, should reduce
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107
See Terri Langford, Costs and Questions as TX Implements New Discovery Law, THE TEX.
TRIB. (May 29, 2014), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/05/29/michael-morton-act-drivingevidence-costs-das/ (stating that costs of providing discovery documents under the Act had been
problematic for some law enforcement agencies); The Michael Morton Act Five Months In: Too
106

Much?

Too

Little?

Too

Soon

To

Tell,

GRITS

FOR

BREAKFAST

(June

5,

2014),

http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2014/06/assessing-michael-morton-act-five.html
concern that crime lab employees need training in Morton Act disclosure requirements).

(noting

108

See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

124 (2015), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=54572 (recommending
that New York follow Texas's lead by adopting criminal discovery reforms similar to those in the
Morton Act).
109
TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 81.072(b) (West 2013).
110
See Brandi Grissom, Ken Anderson Responds to State Bar'sEthics Filing,TEX. TRIB. (Nov.
5,
2012),
https://www.texastribune.org/2012/11/05/ken-anderson-responds-ethics-lawsuit/
(including text of prior state bar rule of disciplinary conduct).
III
See Maurice Chammah, Senate Passes ProsecutorAccountability Bill, TEX. TRIB. (March
26, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/26/senate-passes-prosecutor-accoutability-bill/
(noting that legislative author of bill had said it was inspired by the Morton case).
112

TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 81.072(b) (West 2013).

113

See MORTON ACT REPORT, supra note 91.

See Brian Rogers, Prosecutorin Graves CaseDisbarredin RareMove, HOUS. CHRON. (June
12, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Prosecutor-inGraves-case-disbarred-in-rare-move-632470 1.php.
114
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wrongful convictions. As Michael Morton told reporters after Governor Rick
Perry signed the Morton Act into law, "This will make it much better for
everybody else, so that what happened to me won't happen to you."'115
D. The "Junk Science" Writ: OverturningConvictions Based on Invalid
Science

The Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions also
recommended in 2010 that the legislature create a special writ of habeas corpus
whereby courts would reconsider convictions that were based on forensic
evidence later determined to be invalid.1 16 A year later, in 2011, Neal Hampton
Robbins challenged his capital murder conviction, which rested almost entirely
on the testimony of a medical examiner who had subsequently determined that
her own trial testimony was not correct.117 The Court of Criminal Appeals
of
rejected Robbins's habeas petition, and, in so doing, created a firestorm
118
writ.
science
junk
the
of
enactment
the
motivate
to
controversy that helped
The advisory panel's recommendation, combined with the problematic
example of the Robbins case, apparently precipitated the 2013 statutory
enactment of a "junk science writ" (as it is colloquially called) by the Texas
legislature, the first of its kind in the country. 119 The law expands the right of a
prisoner to challenge his or her conviction on the basis of newly discovered
12 °
evidence by allowing a claim on the grounds of "new scientific evidence.
After further controversy over whether the new law applied to a situation where
an expert changes her opinion, rather than relies on new scientific knowledge,
like Robbins, the legislature in 2015 expanded the grounds of the writ to include

Brian Rogers, New Law ForcesProsecutorsto Turn Over Evidence Against Suspects, Hous.
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston2013),
16,
(May
CHRON.
4 22 8
texas/houston/article/New-law-forces-prosecutors-to-turn-over-evidence- 5 55 .php.
TACP REPORT, supra note 11, at ii; see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
116
115

117
See Exparte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 460-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2374 (2012).
Id. at 463; see also ME Testimony FalseAccording to Science But Not Texas Law, or, Elsa
118
Alcala's First Solo Dance Earns Spotlight, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (July 19, 2011),
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2011/07/me-testimony-false-according-to-science.html
(discussing the Court of Criminal Appeals rejection of Robbins's petition).
2013),
(Tex.
Sess.
Reg.
83rd
Leg.,
2013
344,
S.B.
119
34 4
. S.B. 344
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BilILookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=SB
amended Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to add Article 11.073. TEX. CODE
CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2015). See generally Sabra Thomas, Comment, Addressing
Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of Texas's New Junk Science Writ and OtherMeasuresfor
Protectingthe Innocent, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1037 (2015) (providing a history and discussion of the
passage of the junk science writ).
See Thomas, supra note 119, at 1051.
120
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changes in the scientific conclusions by a testifying expert. 121 The court
ultimately granted Robbins a new trial in 2015.122
Almost immediately, litigants seized upon the new writ in cases that
would not have been otherwise reviewable. Two months after the new writ
became law, three of the four women known in the press as the "San Antonio
123
four" relied on the writ to have their sexual assault convictions overturned.
Another defendant, Rigoberto Avila, used the new junk science writ to have his
January 2014 execution postponed. 124 His murder conviction for the death of his
girlfriend's toddler was based on forensic testimony regarding the cause of the
child's fatal internal injuries. 125 On March 9, 2016, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals sent the case back to the El Paso trial court to review Avila's claim
126
regarding the validity of that forensic evidence.
E.

The Office of Capital andForensic Writs

While the "junk science writ" opened the courthouse doors to defendants
convicted on the basis of invalid forensic evidence, those defendants need legal
counsel to assist them. Accordingly, the Texas Legislature in 2015 enlarged the
mission of the Office of Capital Writs ("OCW") to provide counsel for criminal
defendants who have grounds to file junk science habeas petitions, and renamed
127
the OCW as the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs ("OCFW").

121
H.B.
3724,
2015
Leg.,
84th
Reg.
Sess.
(Tex.
2015),
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB3724. H.B. 3724
amended Chapter 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073(d). TEX. CODE CIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(d) (West 2015).
122 See Exparte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678,680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The State's subsequent

motion for a rehearing of Robbins's case was denied. Exparte Robbins, No. WR-73,484-02, 2016
WL 370157, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2016).
123 See Michelle Mondo, DA Drops 'S.A. Four' Cases, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS (Nov. 15,

2013),

http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/DA-drops-S-A-Four-cases-

4985664.php.

124 Linda Rodriguez McRobbie, In Texas, a New Law Lets Defendants Fight Bad Science,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/02/in-texas-a-newlaw-lets-defendants-fight-bad-science/283895/.
125

Id.

126

See Daniel Borunda, Court Orders Review of El Paso Death Row Case, EL PASO TIMES

(Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/crime/2016/03/09/court-orders-reviewel-paso-death-row-case/81558662/.
127 See
S.B.
1743,
2015
Leg.,
84th
Reg.
Sess.
(Tex.
2015),
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=SB 1743. The idea
was the brain child of Governor Perry's criminal justice policy director who suggested that the
legislature expand the OCW to include attorneys who specialized in both forensic science and
habeas proceedings. She made the suggestion during a brainstorming discussion at a meeting of
the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit. Co-author Thompson attended this meeting.
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Initially, the legislature created the OCW to handle capital writs in
response to another long-simmering scandal. For years, Texas judges appointed
post-conviction habeas counsel for indigent death row inmates from a list of socalled "qualified" counsel, some of whom had repeatedly missed crucial
deadlines or filed embarrassingly inadequate writs of habeas corpus for their
clients. 128 After multiple media reports regarding how these appointed attorneys
had mismanaged or even forfeited their clients' appellate rights, 129 the legislature
in 2009 created the OCW as a public defense office for state death row appeals
to provide the specialized habeas protection needed in cases involving forensic
science irregularity. 130 As of September 1, 2010, Texas district court judges have
death-sentenced
been required to appoint the OCW attorneys to represent
13 1
individuals in state post-conviction habeas proceedings.
As mentioned above, the Texas state legislature in 2015 expanded the
OCW's duties to include filing state habeas petitions on behalf of inmates
convicted on the basis of faulty forensic science and changed the office's
name. 132 Under the new statutory provisions, OCFW lawyers are tasked with
representing inmates in cases referred to the OCFW by the Texas Forensic
Science Commission. 133 This expansion of the OCFW's jurisdiction has been
questioned, given that the legislature failed to provide the office with an
increased budget to handle its new responsibilities. 134 However, the OCFW can
is
refuse to accept either capital or forensic appointments if the office 135
overburdened or lacks sufficient resources to provide adequate representation.

128

See, e.g., Lise Olsen, Tardy Texas Lawyers in Capital Cases Still Paid Thousands, Hous.

CHRON. (Apr. 19,2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Tardy-Texas-lawyersin-capital-cases-still-paid-1739659.php. See generally TEX. DEF. SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE

(2002), http://texasdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/Lethal-Indiff web.pdf
129
See Olsen, supra note 128; see also Lise Olsen, Slow Paperworkin Death Row Cases Ends
Final Appeal For 9, HOuS. CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Slow-paperwork-in-death-row-cases-ends-final- 1736308.php.
See Lise Olsen, Texas Gets Office to Manage Death Row Appeals, Hous. CHRON. (July 27,
130
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-gets-office-to-manage-death2009),
row-appeals- 1722871 .php.
131
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 2(c) (West 2015); 2009 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV.
Ch. 781 (S.B. 1091) (West).
Tex. S.B. 1743.
132
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01, § 4(h) (West 2015).
See Bills Focused on Forensics, Habeas, Alter Post-Conviction Landscape, GRITS FOR
BREAKFAST (June 27, 2015), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2015/06/bills-focused-onforensics-habeas-alter.html.
135
TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 78.054(a) (West 2015).
133

134
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F. Preservingand Testing BiologicalEvidence: Justicefor Victims of
Sexual Assault and Facilitatingthe Discovery of Wrongful Convictions
In the past, biological evidence used to obtain convictions might be
destroyed at some point after the conviction was affirmed on appeal. 136 However,
the use of DNA testing to discover wrongful convictions exposed the critical
need to preserve this biological evidence for longer periods of time.1 37 Thus, the
Texas legislature now requires the preservation and storage of biological
evidence for a period of 40 years or longer for cases in which the perpetrator is
not apprehended, and until a defendant dies or completes the sentence, depending
on the type 8of offense committed, for biological evidence used to obtain a
13
conviction.

In addition, the legislature addressed the concern that too often
biological evidence went untested, resulting in many unsolved sexual assault
cases. To bring overdue justice to sexual assault survivors, Texas state law now
requires the testing of all biological evidence collected in sexual assault cases. 139
To help pay for the testing of a large backlog of biological evidence
specimens,
40
the legislature imposed a tax on sexually-oriented businesses. 1
III. LOCAL INNOVATIONS BECOME NATIONAL MODELS

In Texas, criminal justice reform at the state level has been fueled by
problems and innovations at the local level. In Dallas, for example, the successes
of innocence projects in exonerating the wrongly convicted caught the attention
of a newly elected District Attorney. In response, he decided to involve his
prosecutors directly in the process of reviewing past convictions. 141 In Houston,
the scandals at the HPD Crime Laboratory brought about fundamental changes
in the organizational structure of Houston's forensic laboratory. 142 Thus, in the
state's two largest cities, city leaders embarked on ambitious projects to improve
the quality of criminal justice in ways that would impact the practice of forensic

136
See, e.g., Lauren Kern, Innocence Lost?, Hous. PRESS (Nov. 30, 2000),
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/innocence-lost-6563033 (describing how, in Texas, state law
had allowed biological evidence to be destroyed after a certain time elapsed after conviction).
137

See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Storage of DNA Evidence Crucial to Exonerations,USA TODAY

(Mar.
28,
2011),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-28crimelab28_STN.htm.
138
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.43(c) (West 2015).
139
See TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 420.042 (West 2011).
140

See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.054 (West 2015); Sexually OrientedBusiness Fee

Frequently

Asked

Questions,

TEX.

COMPTROLLER

OF

PUB.

ACCTS.,

https://www.comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/sobf/faq.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
141 See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
142
See infra notes 182-224 and accompanying text.
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science statewide. Indeed, both cities' projects have become national models as
well.
A.

The DallasDistrictAttorney's Office Invents Conviction Integrity Units

Craig Watkins, a defense attorney who had never served as a prosecutor,
became the first African-American District Attorney for Dallas County, Texas,
in 2006.143 At the time, Dallas County had the largest number of DNA
exonerations in the country, 144 and Watkins believed the District Attorney's
process of finding additional wrongful convictions that
Office could facilitate the145
had yet to be discovered.
To do this, Watkins developed an innovative approach to address the
problem of wrongful convictions: he established the first "Conviction Integrity
Unit" ("CIU") in the country in 2007.146 In what would become a national model,
he charged the prosecutors in this unit to partner with attorneys at the Innocence
Project of Texas to review hundreds of old cases to ensure that innocent people
had not been wrongly convicted. 147 The partnership gave the innocence project
attorneys an unprecedented degree of access to police and prosecutor case files,
as well as the power to subpoena key witnesses. 148 From the beginning, Watkins
screened the prosecutors who would work in this unit to ensure that they
demonstrated a dedication to ethical practice149by asking applicants to discuss the
ethical challenges of evidentiary disclosure.
Dallas County had so many exonerations in part because, unlike many
other jurisdictions, the county had preserved its biological evidence rather than
destroy it after cases had concluded.15 ° The cases that Watkins identified for

See Elizabeth Barber, Dallas Targets Wrongful Convictions, and Revolution Starts to
2014),
25,
(May
SCI.
MONITOR
CHRISTIAN
Spread,
http://www.csmonitor.comUSA/Justice/2014/0525/Dallas-targets-wrongful-convictions-andrevolution-starts-to-spread.
144
See Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of GettingIt
Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2012).
145
See Wade Goodwyn, Dallas DA to Review Decades of Convictions, MORNING EDITION,
NPR (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=756561 0.
146
Id.
143

147

See

Conviction

Integrity

Unit,

DALL.

CTY.

DIST.

ATTORNEY,

https://www.dallascounty.org/department/da/conviction-integrity.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
Noah Fromson, Conviction Integrity Units Expand Beyond Texas Roots, TEX. TRIB. (Mar.
148
12, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/03/12/conviction-integrity-units-expand-beyondtexas-roo/.
149

See CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNIT: VANGUARD OF

http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp6
(2014),
REFORM
JUSTICE
content/uploads/2014/12/Conviction-Integrity-Units.pdf.
See Barber, supra note 143 (noting that Harris County, Texas, had destroyed most of its
150
DNA evidence post-conviction, making it impossible for its CIU to review old cases in the same
CRIMINAL

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

review included many in which prosecutors had previously worked vigorously
Dallas CIU
to defeat defendants' requests for DNA testing. 151 As of 2014, 15the
2
was responsible for the release of 33 wrongly convicted people.
Prosecutors around the country followed Watkins's lead to establish
over 25 such CIUs. 15 3 Fourteen of these CIUs have been announced since the
start of 2014.154 Although CIUs are estimated to operate in less than 1% of all
local district and county attorney's offices, 155 in Texas, the trend to establish
CIUs has caught on widely. The five largest urban centers in the state-Harris
County (Houston), Dallas County (Dallas), Bexar County (San Antonio), Travis
County (Austin), and Tarrant County (Fort Worth)-have CIUs in their District
was established in
Attorney's Offices. 156 The newest CIU, in Tarrant County,
157
2016 and has already uncovered one wrongful conviction.
While not directly impacting the quality of forensic science, the CIUs
have uncovered problems with forensic evidence. For example, police
departments around the country, including the HPD, have used notoriously
unreliable drug field tests for many years. 158 The Department of Justice in 1978
declared that these tests were so unreliable that they "should not be used for
evidential purposes," and their results continue to be inadmissible as evidence in
most American jurisdictions. 159 The problem in Houston (and elsewhere) is that

way as Dallas County); Goodwyn, supra note 145 (commenting on the "treasure trove" of
biological evidence Dallas County had preserved).
151 See Ware, supra note 144, at 1041-49 (summarizing illustrative Dallas County exonerations
and describing "intransigence" on part of previous district attorneys who had opposed DNA
testing).
152
See Barber, supra note 143.
153

See JOHN HOLLWAY, UNIV. OF PA. LAW SCH., CONVICTION REVIEW UNITS: A NATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE

10

(2016),

http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2615&context=faculty-scholarship.
154
1d. at 11.
See Fromson, supra note 148.
156 Id.
See Dawn Boswell, Tarrant DA Examines Claims of Innocence, Wrongful Convictions,
157
STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.star-telegram.con/opinion/opn-columnsblogs/other-voices/article66982412.html. Unfortunately, medium-sized and smaller cities and
towns have not had the wherewithal to establish CIUs, thus leaving huge gaps in the availability
of conviction integrity reviews statewide. This is an issue that is somewhat filled by the statewide
forensic reviews facilitated by state agencies. See supra Part III. Nonetheless, it would behoove
state leaders to study methods for providing regional prosecution resources to facilitate ongoing
reexamination of convictions in those areas.
158
See Ryan Gabrielson & Topher Sanders, How a $2 Roadside Drug Test Sends Innocent
MAG.
(July
7,
2016),
to
Jail,
N.Y.
TIMES
People
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/magazine/how-a-2-roadside-drug-test-sends-innocentpeople-to-jail.html?smid=tw-nytmag&smtyp=cur&_r=t1.
155

159

Id.
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people-many of whom were actually innocent-were allowed to 16plead
guilty
0
to drug charges before confirmatory drug tests could be performed.
Fortunately, the Manager of the Controlled Substances Section of the
Houston Forensic Science Center, James Miller, made it his practice to hold onto
drug evidence, even following guilty pleas when the law would normally allow
destruction of the evidence.1 6 1 He made it the laboratory's practice to test all drug
evidence, and if those tests showed no controlled1 substances
were present, he
62
notified the District Attorney's Office accordingly.
These laboratory reports had gone unnoticed in the District Attorney's
Office until early 2014 when Inger Chandler, the Chief of the Harris County
District Attorney's CIU, got a tip from a reporter about the possibility that
Houston might have wrongful convictions of this type.'1 63 The reporter had found
21 reported cases where courts had reversed drug convictions because the
laboratory reports later showed no drugs were present. 164 Chandler's
investigation uncovered hundreds of cases in which people pleaded guilty based
on information that varied from the laboratory report, 212 of which indicated no
controlled substances were present. 65 She then began the process of notifying
defense counsel and defendants of the discovery, as is required under the Morton
Act. 166 As described above, unlike other states, the Morton Act requires Texas
prosecutors to notify defendants
and defense counsel about exonerating
167
information post-conviction.
In 2015, about one-third of the 149 exonerations in the country were
Harris County drug cases in which people had pleaded guilty. 168 The 42 Harris
County cases represent 89% of all the drug exonerations in 2 0 1 5 .169 Since mid2014 when Chandler began
her investigation, the Harris County CIU has brought
170
about 73 exonerations.
Working with the Houston Forensic Science Center,1 71 Chandler helped
to implement a new policy to test drug evidence in the order in which it arrives
at the lab. If the tests prove there are no illegal substances present, the public

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h)-(k) (West 2015).

167

Id.

168

See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,

EXONERATIONS

http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations
169

Id.

170

Id. at 10.

IN 2015,

at

1 (2016),

in_2015.pdf.

171 See infra notes 192-224 and accompanying text.
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defender's office is notified so its attorneys can file a writ to have the conviction
gives
reversed. 172 The public defender's office, which handles most of the cases,
173
sentence.
a
serving
currently
is
someone
priority to any cases in which
Prosecutors in the state's CIUs have also assisted legislatively-created
stakeholder groups that study the causes of wrongful convictions by advocating
for best practices and sharing information about their offices' innovative
practices. The Dallas County CIU advocated for the adoption of best practices in
eyewitness identification procedures used by the state's police departments. 74
The Tarrant County unit hosted a meeting of the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel
on Wrongful Convictions, the state's first stakeholder group studying wrongful
convictions, to demonstrate how its electronic discovery system allows most
defense counsel to access their clients' case files by logging into a computer
system established by the District Attorney's Office.175 At a recent meeting of a
second such stakeholder group, the chief of the Tarrant County CIU told the
group about the office's new police informant tracking system that better enables
notify defense counsel about the backgrounds of police
the office 7to
6
1
informants.
Thus, the Dallas CIU put in place a new and powerful mechanism for
uncovering wrongful convictions, but CIUs have accomplished much more.
When wrongful convictions are discovered, prosecutors in CIUs also conduct
root causes analyses, along with other participants in the criminal justice system,
such as public defenders, forensic laboratories, and the police. 177 They then play
a proactive role in implementing local policies and practices to prevent wrongful
convictions. Armed with the expertise of correcting root causes of wrongful
convictions, CIU prosecutors have used their roles as a platform to educate the
public, stakeholders, and the legislature about the ways that the criminal justice
system may put innocent people at risk and the various methods to minimize
those risks. 178 Perhaps most importantly, prosecutors in CIUs serve as role
172

See Jessica Lussenhop, Why Harris County, Texas, Leads the U.S. in Exonerations, BBC

NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35543898.
173 Id.
174

See CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, supra note 149, at 7.

175 Co-author Thompson attended this meeting in Tarrant County when she served as a member
of the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel for Wrongful Convictions.
176 This was reported by Dawn Moore Boswell, the Chief of the CI in Tarrant County at the
June 28, 2016 meeting of the Timothy Cole Exoneration Review Commission in Austin, Texas,
which co-author Thompson attended.
177
See Inger H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past, Changing the
16,
14,
at
2016,
Summer
JUST.,
CRIM.
Future,
http ://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/v3 1/chand

ler.authcheckdam.pdf (describing how Texas CIU chiefs conduct procedural reviews to determine
the root causes of wrongful convictions and "near misses").
178 The Chief of the Harris County CIU spoke at a symposium on forensic science hosted by
the Houston Forensic Science Center in 2015, for example, which was attended by the co-authors.
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models for a new generation of prosecutors who are learning what ethical
practice means in an office that strives to ensure the integrity of all convictions.
As stated by the Chief of the Tarrant County Unit in a 2016 op-ed piece, "The
criminal justice system must willingly engage in the sort of self-reflection
essential to maintaining the public's trust and advancing confidence in the
180
1 79
The author of a national study of CIUs
processes that lead to convictions.
(which he refers to as "Conviction Review Units" or CRUs) made this
observation:
Sincere CRUs that conduct open and honest reviews of postconviction claims of actual innocence stand as a triumph of truth
and justice over procedural legal formality, and of collaboration
over adversarialism, competitiveness, or bias. As such, they
restore faith in our criminal justice system by practicing the
highest ideals of truth and justice that are often preached, and
often doubted. 18 1
18 2
B. Houston Removes its Crime Laboratoryfrom the Police Department

As has been typical in Texas, a scandal, this one of enormous
proportions, served as a catalyst for another uniquely innovative reform. This
time, recurring crises at Houston's crime laboratory galvanized the community
to make a dramatic departure from past practices. Problems of ineptitude,
evidence contamination, mismanagement, and fraud at the HPD Crime
Laboratory came to light following a series of news reports in 2002.183 These
CIU prosecutors have testified at legislative hearings as witnessed by co-author Thompson. They
have even published op-ed pieces in local newspapers explaining their role. See Boswell, supra
note 157.
179
See id. The chief of the CIU in Harris County, Texas, has recently commented on the greater
cooperation with the defense bar in the review process. She wrote: "Interestingly, the unit has
found that a collaborative approach to cases (prosecutors and defense attorneys working together)
results in a more meaningful and comprehensive investigation. The Harris County unit has worked
hand-in-hand with defense counsel in reviewing reports, reviewing evidence, locating witnesses,
and conducting interviews." See Chandler, supra note 177, at 15.
180 See Michael R. Bromwich, Crime Lab Proposal is a Major Step Toward Independence,
Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.chron.com/pinion/outlook/article/Crime-labproposal-is-a-major-step-toward-3430904.php?cmpid=emailarticle&cmpid=emailarticle
(describing the history of the HPD crime lab scandal that led to a proposal to remove lab from HPD
control).
181
See HOLLWAY, supra note 153, at 11.
182 Both co-authors of this article are charter members of the Houston Forensic Science Center
Local Government Corporation Board of Directors, with co-author Cdsarez currently serving as
board chair, and co-author Thompson acting as vice-chair.
183
See, e.g., Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/09/us/houston-s-troubled-dnacrime-lab-faces-growing-scrutiny.html?_r=0.
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revelations led to a state audit as well as independent investigations, including
84
one by former Justice Department Inspector General Michael Bromwich.1 At
least four men were exonerated after spending years in prison in part because of
shoddy forensic testing and/or testimony by HPD laboratory analysts. 8 5 By
moniker of "worst crime laboratory
2003, the laboratory had earned the unsavory
86
in the country" from the New York Times.'
For almost a decade, continual revelations about the HPD laboratory's
shortcomings generated bad press on a national scale.18 7 Even the National
Academy of Sciences ("NAS") took note, prominently mentioning the HPD
in its discussion of "errors and frauds" in its landmark
crime laboratory's failures
88
2009 NAS Report.1

Fed up with the unceasing negative publicity and desirous to fix the
troubled crime laboratory once and for all, then-Mayor Annise Parker, in 2011,
embraced a proposal from HPD leadership to remove the laboratory from HPD
control. 8 9 This proposal corresponded with the NAS Report's repeated call for
forensic laboratories to be independent from law enforcement, the achievement
of which, the report explained, would foster a scientific research culture, reduce
motivational and unconscious cognitive bias among laboratory analysts, and
allow laboratory directors, rather than police chiefs, to set laboratory budget
priorities. 190 Following negotiations among city leaders, HPD, and the Houston

For a detailed account of how the HPD crime laboratory scandal unfolded over a decade,
see THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 205-11.
After serving 17 years for kidnapping and rape, George Rodriguez was released from prison
185
in 2004 when DNA testing cleared him of the crime. See id. at 3-27. Josiah Sutton, who served
three years for a rape he did not commit, was released in March 2003 and pardoned in 2004. See
id. at 205. In 2008, subsequent DNA testing exonerated two men convicted of rape, Gary Alvin
Richard (who spent 22 years in prison) and Ronald Gene Taylor (who served 12 years). HPD
laboratory analysts had misrepresented the results of forensic testing at both of their trials. See id.
at 209.
Liptak, supra note 24.
186
See, e.g., Never-Ending Scandal: Will We Ever Fix HPD's Crime Lab?, Hous. CHRON.
187
184

(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Never-ending-scandal-Will-weever-fix-HPD-s-2132873.php (reviewing a decade's worth of headlines with respect to the HPD
crime lab's failures); Maurice Possley, Steve Mills & Flynn McRoberts, Scandal Touches Even
Elite Labs, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi041021 forensics-story.html (describing the HPD lab's continuing problems).
NAS REPORT, supra note 74, at 44-45.
188
See THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 211 -12.
189
NAS REPORT, supra note 74, at 23-24, 183-85, 190-91. In particular, Recommendation 4
190
of the NAS Report called for public forensic laboratories to be removed "from the administrative
control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors' offices." Id. at 24. Not everyone supported the
NAS's call for crime laboratory independence. For example, the National District Attorneys
Association ("NDAA") in 2010 announced its opposition to any attempts to take crime laboratories
away from the control of law enforcement. See RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO
STRENGTHEN FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N (2010),
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Police Officers Union, 191 the Houston City Council, in June 2012, approved the
creation of the Houston Forensic Science Center, Inc. as a local government
corporation 192 tasked with operating an independent laboratory "to'1 93
provide
accurate and timely analysis of forensic evidence and related services."
The laboratory, now a local government corporation, operates in similar

fashion to a publicly-held corporation. Under this unique organizational
structure, the corporation is governed by a nine-member board of directors
composed of community volunteers who are nominated by the mayor and
confirmed by the city council. 194 Given that board members need not be forensic

http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA-strengthen forensicscienceresolution_4_10.pdf (stating that
the "NDAA opposes proposals that would require crime laboratories to be independent, rather than
autonomous, of law enforcement or prosecution agencies where they may be currently located").
Additionally, the International Association of Police Chiefs in 2009 adopted as its official policy
that it "is strongly opposed to the removal of crime laboratories and other forensic services from
law enforcement agencies." See Joseph Polski, Forensic Science: A Critical Concern for Police
Chiefs, POLICE CHIEF MAG., Sept. 2009, at 24-25.
More recently, an article in the PoliceQuarterlysuggested that separating crime laboratories
from police departments could have "serious unintended consequences" by limiting the flow of
information between criminal investigators and laboratory analysts. See Edward R. Maguire,
William R. King, William Wells & Charles M. Katz, Potential Unintended Consequences of the
Movement Toward Forensic Laboratory Independence, 18 POLICE Q. 272, 275, 281-82 (2015).
This conclusion overlooks well-documented research showing how scientific conclusions can be
adversely affected when investigators share biasing information with forensic scientists. See, e.g.,
NAS REPORT, supra note 74, at 122-24; see also Ensuring That ForensicAnalysis is Based Upon
Task-Relevant Information, NAT'L COMM'N ON FORENSIC SCI. (Dec. 8, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818196/download.
191 For a description of these negotiations, see THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 212-14.
192
Under Texas law, "a local government corporation may be created to aid and act on behalf
of one or more local governments to accomplish any governmental purpose of those local
governments." TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 43 1.101 (a) (West 2011).
193
See
Houston,
Tex.,
Res.
No.
2012-17
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/resources/$1 $3.dOuqmU$cL.w2mdGZv9 1a6asV.PU.pdf.
Although the entity was originally named "Houston Forensic Science LGC, Inc.," its name was
changed to "Houston Forensic Science Center, Inc." in 2014. MEETING OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
MINUTES,
Hous.
FORENSIC
SCIENCE
LGC,
INC.,
(2014),

http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/meeting/577161 cdulJ qSigned.pdf.
194

See HouS. FORENSIC SCIENCE LGC, INC., CERTIFICATION OF FORMATION (2012) [hereinafter

CERTIFICATION

OF

FORMATION],

http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/resources/$1 $Ceq3tCy9$yvywgiarbdoOOS.Sedtx.pdf. In
an effort to shield the HFSC and its directors from political influences, a director may not be
removed unless he or she has engaged in intentional, unlawful behavior that is related to his or her
official duties. THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 214. Since its inception, the HFSC board of directors
has reflected both ethnic and general diversity, as well as a variety of experience and expertise. Id.
at 215-16. For example, the initial HFSC board consisted of licensed attorneys and academics with
expertise in criminal law and wrongful convictions, business managers, a former judge, a retired
assistant chief of police, and a former state legislator. Id. In 2015, Death Row exoneree Anthony
Graves was named to serve on the board, the second Texas exoneree to do so. See Jon Schuppe,
How Anthony Graves Went from Death Row to Overseeing the Houston Crime Laboratory,NBC
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scientists themselves, the corporate governance structure provides for the
of scientists to advise the board
creation of a Technical Advisory Group ("TAG")
195
regarding best practices in scientific matters.
For most of its first two years of existence, the board dealt with transition
issues, such as hiring an executive director, engaging Michael Bromwich to
conduct a follow-up audit of the laboratory, appointing and meeting with TAG
members, inviting community stakeholders to the board's monthly open
meetings, and negotiating with the HPD regarding which assets and divisions of
the HPD laboratory would be transferred to the HFSC. 196 Finally, on April 3,
2014, pursuant to an interlocal agreement with the City of Houston, the HFSC
assets and assumed
took possession of designated HPD crime laboratory
197
responsibility for the laboratory's future operations.
Since that time, the HFSC has hired an exceptional group of qualified
staff members to manage and operate the laboratory, including seven scientists
with doctoral degrees, and more than 40 with master's degrees) 98 The HFSC
also expanded the range of forensic services it provides by adding a latent print
division in 2014,199 as well as a trace evidence division in 2015.200 In two years,
seven of the eight laboratory divisions have been awarded international ISO
accreditation: DNA/biology, controlled substances, toxicology, firearms, trace
evidence, digital multimedia, and latent prints.20 '

NEWS (June 27, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-anthony-graves-

went-death-row-overseeing-his-local-crime-n3 81891.
195
See CERTIFICATION OF FORMATION, supra note 194.
See THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 216-20.
196
197

Id. at 222.

See HOUSTON FORENSIC SCIENCE CENTER, 2015 ANNUAL REVIEW 2 (2016) [hereinafter 2015
ANNUAL REVIEW] (on file with authors). In 2016, HFSC staff presented seven papers at the
Academy of Forensic Sciences annual convention, the HFSC's scientific training director was
appointed to lead the U.S. delegation to the International Standards Organization's Technical
Committee on Forensic Sciences meeting in the Netherlands, and the HFSC executive director was
consulted by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. See MEETING OF
198

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: MINUTES, supra note 193.

See Press Release, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., HFSC's Latent Print Section Fully Certified
2016),
11,
(Feb.
In
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/l SDmlHceDLR5amFhfdE3dkA1A62XG.pdf
2009, an external audit revealed so many problems with the HPD fingerprint comparison unit that
it was shut down, and the city contracted with a private firm to provide fingerprint analyses. Moises
Mendoza & Bradley Olson, Major, Costly Overhaul Likely in HPD Fingerprint Unit, HOUS.
CHRON. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Major-costly-overhaullikely-in-HPD-fingerprint- 1739953.php.
199

200

See 2015 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 198, at 5.

SCI.
FORENSIC
Hous.
Accreditation,
See
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/accreditation.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).
201
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Under HFSC leadership, the laboratory has also increased its
productivity, reducing backlogs and improving turnaround times. °2 In February
2015, the HFSC made national headlines after eliminating a legacy backlog of
approximately 6,600 untested sexual assault kits, some of which dated back to
the 1980s. 20 3 By January 2016, the HFSC had entirely eliminated backlogs in its

controlled substances and firearms sections, two huge areas of work for the
laboratory.20 4 This achievement is even more remarkable given that the HFSC
employs the strict Department of Justice definition of "backlog," which includes
any evidence submission upon which testing is not completed within 30 days.20 5
I Turnaround time for laboratory tests on drugs averaged 13 days in April 2016,
whereas drug testing at the old HPD crime laboratory took months, and
sometimes years.20 6 Efficiencies and streamlined processes implemented by
laboratory managers reduced turnaround times on casework across all laboratory
divisions by 25% in 2015207 and by 52% to date in 2016.208
Another unique feature of the HFSC lies in its commitment to
transparency in its dealings with stakeholders and the public. The board meets
each month in open session where board members are updated on the status of
laboratory operations and where backlogs and other challenges are discussed
candidly. 20 9 Board meetings are videotaped, and the videos are posted on the
HFSC's website, where they can be viewed by all.210 In the few instances in
which complaints have been filed against the HFSC with the TFSC, laboratory
management has engaged the City of Houston's Office of Inspector General

202

Press Release, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., HFSC Works with HPD to Tackle Property Crimes

in Houston, (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/576be92e.pdf. When it
took over operations from HPD, the HFSC inherited a backlog of about 12,000 cases. Id.
203 See Katherine Driessen & Mike Morris, Tests of Rape Kits Could Have Halted Future
Attacks,
Hous.
CHRON.
(Mar.
7,
2015,
10:49
PM),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Tests-of-rape-kits-couldhave-halted-future-6121432.php. These kits were outsourced for testing and then analyzed
internally by HFSC examiners. Id.
204

See 2015 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 198, at 5.

205

See id. at 3 (listing HFSC's goal of "all casework completed in 30 days"); see also NAS

REPORT, supra note 74, at 39 (providing DOJ definition of "backlog"). Not all laboratories use

such an aggressive definition of backlog, which makes comparisons difficult. See 2015 ANNUAL
REVIEW, supra note 198, at 63.
206 See Meagan Flynn, Would a City-County Merger JeopardizeProgress at Houston's New
and Improved Crime Lab?, Hous.
PRESS
(Apr.
7,
2016,
9:00
AM),
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/would-a-city-county-merger-j eopardize-progress-athoustons-new-and-improved-crime-laboratory-8300007.
207
2015 ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 198, at 2.
208 See Hous. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., OPERATIONS REPORT 3 (2016) (on file with authors).
209

See

Our

Meeting

Archive,

HOus.

FORENSIC

SCI.

CTR.,

http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/meeting-archives.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
210

Id.
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("OIG") to investigate the complaint and has waived attorney-client privilege so
that the resulting OIG reports can be shared with the media, the public, and the
TFSC. 2 11 Ironically, by virtue of its transparency, the HFSC has occasionally
suffered negative publicity simply because it owns up to challenges that are
among crime laboratories, but are rarely, if ever, discussed in
widely shared
2
public.

21

Most impressively, the HFSC is the first crime laboratory in the country
21 3
to implement blind quality control testing to gauge its analysts' skill levels.
Although laboratory accreditation agencies require laboratory analysts to take
periodic proficiency tests, 214 the usefulness of those tests has been questioned

given that analysts know they are being tested.215 It stands to reason that analysts
will perform more carefully when they are aware they are being evaluated;
accordingly, blind testing more accurately measures the quality of an analyst's

See, e.g., Press Release, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., City of Houston Inspector General
Releases Report on Anonymous Complaint Filed Against Houston Forensic Science Center (June
2016),
10,
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/IFG4MTnRI1XJWgJFE.crv0tgm21Nq.pdf
212
For example, after its reporter attended a public board meeting, a local television station in
April 2016, reported that the HFSC was developing a "creeping" backlog of 333 sexual assault kits
(meaning kits not completed by the laboratory within 30 days)-something that the board had been
working openly to eliminate for several months. Jeremy Rogalski, City's Rape Kit Backlog
PM),
11:24
2016,
4,
(Apr.
KHOU
Up,
Back
Creeping
http://www.khou.com/news/investigations/citys-rape-kit-backlog-creeping-back/l 19672065. The
next month, county officials were shocked to learn that the Harris County Institute of Forensic
Sciences had developed a backlog of more than 4,600 DNA cases, had tripled its overall backlog
in three years, and had 148 sexual assault kits older than 60 days (the county laboratory's SAK
turnaround time goal). See Mihir Zaveri, HarrisCounty Crime Lab Faces Heavy Backlog of DNA
AM),
10:51
12,
2016,
(May
CHRON.
Hous.
Cases,
http ://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-crime-labfaces-heavy-backlog-of-7465797.php. The existence of this backlog only came to light after
laboratory management applied for a National Institute of Justice backlog-reduction grant for its
DNA division. Id.
211

213

See NAT'L COMM'N ON FORENSIC SC., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION OPTIMIZING HUMAN

PERFORMANCE IN CRIME LABORATORIES THROUGH TESTING AND FEEDBACK 5-6 n.18 (2016)
[hereinafter VIEWS OF COMMISSION] (listing the HFSC and the Netherlands Forensic Institute as
examples of crime laboratories that have adopted blind testing); see also Press Release, Hous.
Forensic Sci. Ctr., HFSC Adds Blind Test Samples into Workflow, Leading the Way Nationally
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/576be9e2.pdf.
214
See, e.g., AM. ASSOC. FOR LAB. ACCREDITATION, R103-GENERAL REQUIREMENTS:
(2013),
LABORATORIES
17025
ISO/IEC
FOR
TESTING
PROFICIENCY
https://www.a2la.org/requirements/rl03-2013.pdf (stating that "[r]esults from [proficiency
testing] are an indication of a laboratory's competence and are an integral part of the assessment
and accreditation process").
215
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REv. 725, 771 (2011) (explaining that implementation of blind proficiency
tests in forensic laboratories would "make casework better comport with scientific principles for
the production of knowledge").
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regular casework.2 1 6 The HFSC added blind quality control samples to its regular
workflow in its toxicology, firearms and controlled substances divisions in 2015,
and plans to include biology and latent prints by the end of 2016.217 By designing
and executing an innovative and ground-breaking blind testing program, the
HFSC has218received national recognition for its commitment to best scientific
practices.
Nonetheless, the HFSC faces challenges due to some lingering public
perceptions that associate the city's laboratory with incompetence. 1 9 Convincing
Houstonians of the laboratory's independence and transformation has been made
harder by the fact that most of the laboratory remains in the HPD building.
This arrangement leaves much to be desired for another reason as well. The highrise office space of HPD headquarters was not designed to house a wet
laboratory. 221 The laboratory space is neither adequate nor large enough to house
a forensic laboratory of the size needed by a growing city.
In the past, underfunding was a primary cause of the original HPD crime
laboratory disaster, as it has been a cause of problems in forensic laboratories
nationwide.22 2 Today, like most forensic laboratories, the HFSC struggles to
obtain adequate funding during a time of shrinking city coffers. 223 Thus, while
See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, FingerprintErrorRates and Proficiency Tests: What They
Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1095 (2008) (stating that proficiency tests
216

should be blind because "knowledge that one is being tested makes examiners more vigilant than
when they are performing casework").
Press Release, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., HFSC Adds Blind Test Samples in Two More
217
2015),
16,
(Dec.
Disciplines
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/lLaRAaicXJz8jqwPmMCIUIf9NgFmx.pdf.
See VIEWS OF COMMISSION, supra note 213.
218
For example, in the most recent mayoral election, one candidate made closing the HFSC a
219
major part of his platform, stating that taxpayers should not "prop up" a crime laboratory known
for producing "shoddy work." See Public Safety, BILL KING FOR Hous. MAYOR (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.billkingforhouston.com/issues/2015/september/i 1/public-safety.aspx.
Press Release, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., HFSC Changes Corporate Address (Jan. 6, 2016),
220
http://www.houstonforensicscience.org/news/576be971.pdf Although the HFSC changed its
corporate address and moved three of its divisions to a nearby office building in 2016, the Center's
wet laboratories remain in HPD headquarters. Id.
Id.
221
See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Officials Ignored Houston Lab's Troubles, Report Finds,N.Y.
222
TIMES (July 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/01/us/officials-ignored-houston-labstroubles-report-finds.html? r=0 (describing faulty HPD crime laboratory facilities, inadequate and
untrained staff, as well as refusal of police chief to spend money to hire additional analysts or fix
the laboratory's problems). See generally THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 37-39 (addressing the
scandals in crime laboratories caused by choked budgets).
See, e.g., Mike Morris, Turner Callsfor SharedSacrifice in Battling City's FinancialWoes,
223
Hous. CHRON. (Jan. 4, 2016, 11:29 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston6 364 2 7
.php (noting that in
texas/houston/article/Tumer-calls-for-shared-sacrifice-in-battling- 7
2016, Houston's mayor called for streamlined city spending to reduce the city's $126 million
budget deficit).
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Houston achieved national acclaim just a few years ago by creating an
independent crime laboratory,2 24 the more important question may be whether
the laboratory will have the wherewithal going forward to build on its early
successes.
IV. THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN OPERATION: STATEWIDE SYSTEMIC REVIEWS OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE IRREGULARITIES

Having erected an elaborate infrastructure to support the practice of
forensic science, the state has been in a unique position to respond to large-scale
problems that develop whenever a problem with a forensic discipline is
discovered. In addition to its role implementing regulations prospectively to
improve the quality of forensic investigations, the TFSC has also examined entire
forensic disciplines to determine whether they measure up to today's scientific
standards.2 25 When particular areas of forensic science are found to be
scientifically invalid, the Commission has partnered with other agencies and
groups, including the state fire marshal and the Innocence Project of Texas
("IPOT"), to conduct retroactive reviews of Texas convictions that were based,
at least in part, on faulty evidence or testimony. 226 To organize these large-scale
reviews of old convictions, the TFSC has mobilized criminal justice stakeholders
representing all facets of the forensic science infrastructure to work
cooperatively.2 2 7 In the most recent instance, the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity
Unit called a meeting of prosecutors (mostly from CIUs), public defenders,
innocence project representatives, academics, and others to meet with the
General Counsel of TFSC so that the entire group could learn about a forensic
science problem and to devise strategies for conducting the large-scale systemic
review.228
As a result, the TFSC has been described as one of the most important
forensic science reform groups in the nation 229 -a remarkable accomplishment
given that the Commission's mission was almost derailed by politics in relation
to the Willingham case described above.23 °
224
See, e.g., Roger Koppl & E. James Cowan, Steps to Take to Resolve Crime Lab Problems,
INDEP. INST. (May 21, 2012), http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=3327
(describing Houston as a city "on the right track" by virtue of its decision to create an independent
crime laboratory); see also David A. Harris, Houston Ahead of Curve in ForensicScience, Hous.
CHRON. (Jan. 18, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Houston-aheadof-curve-in-forensic-science-4206722.php.
225
See generally Hall, supra note 46, at 102-05, 150-55.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
229
See Hall, supra note 46, at 105.
230
See id.; see also Mills & Possley, supra note 40 (discussing the execution of Cameron Todd
Willingham on disproved forensics).
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After the controversy over the Willingham case, the TFSC decided to
ensure that other cases involving questionable arson testimony were reviewed.
The TFSC reached out to the state fire marshal's office, and asked it to re1
examine arson convictions where unscientific methods may have been used.
Not only did the state fire marshal agree, but he also accepted an offer from the
IPOT to assist in the case review.13 2 After initially contacting 1,085 Texas
defendants who had been convicted of arson, IPOT lawyers identified 33 arson
convictions that warranted further investigation.233 By 2014, nine of those cases
had been reviewed by an advisory panel of legal and forensic experts assembled
by the state fire marshal and IPOT, and five of those nine convictions were found
to rely on scientifically unsound arson techniques.234 In June, 2016, a district
court ruled that the defendant in one of those cases had presented overwhelming
2016, the Court of Criminal
evidence of actual innocence,2 35 and in November
23 6
Appeals affirmed this finding and granted relief.

Three years after organizing the arson project, the TFSC implemented a
similar re-examination of Texas convictions in which microscopic hair analysis
linked a defendant to a crime scene.237 The TFSC announcement followed the
FBI's decision to review cases in which its examiners testified about hair and
fiber evidence, based on concerns that those examiners frequently overstated
their findings in ways that benefited the prosecution.2 38 The Commission's
decision made Texas the first state to institute a statewide review of convictions

See Brandi Grissom, ForensicPanelCallsforReview ofPastArson Cases, TEX. TRIB. (Sept.
9, 2011, 2:15 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/09/09/science-panel-agrees-review-pastarson-evidence/.
See Hall, supra note 46, at 152.
232
See Maurice Chammah, Arson Reviewers Expect Small Number of Problem Cases, TEX.
233
231

TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:20 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/25/arson-reviewersexpect-small-number-problem-cases/.
See Chuck Lindell, Abbott: Review of Old Arson Cases Is Legal, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN
234
(Apr. 7, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/abbott-review-of-old-arsoncases-is-legal/nfTL3/.
See Brantley Hargrove, Sonia Cacy Found to Be Innocent, TEX. MONTHLY: DAILY POST
235
(June 6, 2016), http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/sonia-cacy-found-innocent/.
See Exparte Cacy, No. WR-85, 420-01, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 982 (Tex.
236
Crim. App Nov. 2, 2016).
See Jordan Smith, HairAnalysis: The Root of the Evidence Problem, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan.
237
13, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2014-01-1 3/hair-analysis-theroot-of-the-evidence-problem/.
See id.; see also Hall, supra note 46, at 153. In 2015, the FBI admitted that FBI hair
238
examiners had exaggerated their findings in more than 90% of trial transcripts that were reviewed.
FBI Testimony on MicroscopicHairAnalysis ContainedErrorsin at Least 90 Percent of Cases in
2015),
20,
(Apr.
INVESTIGATION
OF
BUREAU
FED.
Review,
Ongoing
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysiscontained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review.
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that involved hair microscopy testimony and reflected the Commission's concern
that many Texas hair examiners had received FBI training.239
To assist with the case review, the Commission again appointed a team
of subject matter experts that included crime laboratory, law enforcement, IPOT,
prosecution, and public defender representatives. 240 The TFSC also created a
protocol in conjunction with the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit 241 to notify
affected parties in cases where problematic hair evidence or testimony factored
significantly in the case outcome.242 As of November 2015, the team had
reviewed 11 out of 287 cases in which hair evidence positively linked a defendant
to a crime scene, and found testimony that amounted to "notifiable error[]" in
five of those convictions.24 3
In another national first, the TFSC, in 2016, recommended that state trial
judges should exclude bite-mark evidence as a means of identification in criminal
trials. 244 The call for a moratorium came after a six-month TFSC investigation
concluded that forensic odontology, commonly known as bite-mark analysis,
currently lacks an adequate scientific foundation.2 45 The Commission launched
its bite-mark investigation after the national Innocence Project filed a complaint
on behalf of Steven Chaney, who had been convicted in 1987 of a Dallas murder
based in large part on the testimony of a forensic dentist. 246 Chaney's conviction

was set aside in 2015 after the dentist recanted his testimony, describing it in a
sworn statement as "scientifically unsound., 247 In its investigation, the TFSC
also identified at least 35 other Texas cases for review where bite-mark evidence
was utilized.2 48 While Texas judges are not legally obligated to follow the
TFSC's moratorium recommendation, the Commission's action attracted
national headlines and was described as a "major credibility blow" to a forensic

Smith, supra note 237.
240
Id.
241
The Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit was created by Judge Barbara Hervey of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in 2008 to address problems in the criminal justice system. Jordan
Smith, A Dose of Integrity for Texas Criminal Justice, AUSTIN CHRON. (June 27, 2008),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2008-06-27/640107/.
242
See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 65, at 17-18.
239

Id. at 18.
See Erik Eckholm, Texas Panel Callsfor an End to CriminalIDs via Bite Mark, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/us/texas-panel-calls-for-an-end-to-criminalids-via-bite-mark.html.
245
Id.
246
See Hall, supra note 46, at 104.
243

244

247

Id.

248

See Eckholm, supra note 244.
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discipline that has been responsible nationally for at least 24 wrongful arrests
and convictions.249
Finally, in yet another statewide reassessment, the TFSC, in 2015,
announced it was facilitating a review of thousands of convictions that were
based on incorrect statistical interpretations of DNA mixtures-samples that
include more than one person's DNA. 250 The problem with mixtures came to
light in May 2015, when "the FBI notified the public that it had identified some
errors in the population data used to generate statistical calculations when
1
analyzing DNA cases by crime laboratories around the country. '25 The changes
in the population statistics were not expected to have any material impact on the
statistics derived in criminal cases, but in the process of recalculating some old
cases, it was discovered that older cases involving complex DNA mixtures had
not been interpreted according to currently acceptable standards.252 In some
cases, the use of the proper laboratory protocols could materially affect the
statistical conclusion about whether a particular defendant's genetic material was
included in a DNA mixture left at a crime scene.253
When this problem with the calculation of DNA mixtures came to light,
accrediting organizations called on crime laboratories to review old cases to
ensure that the miscalculations had not brought about any wrongful
convictions. 254 The Texas laboratories, in turn, looked to the TFSC to facilitate
such reviews.255 The Commission brought together the various stakeholders to
collaborate on a solution.25 6 As a result, forensic scientists, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges worked together with the TFSC to develop a plan to examine
past cases, notify those affected, and, if appropriate, provide legal representation
to those who may have been wrongly convicted.257 The Texas Indigent Defense
Commission supported the case reviews by providing funding for a coordinated
team of attorneys "to provide assistance to indigent defendants [] affected by the
249

Paul J. Weber, Texas 1st State to Recommend Court Ban on Bite MarkEvidence, FORENSIC

MAG. (Feb. 16, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://www.forensicmag.com/news/2016/02/texas-Ist-state-

recommend-court-ban-bite-mark-evidence.
See, e.g., Gabrielle Banks, Texas Leading Massive Review of Criminal Cases Based on
250
AM),
11:21
2016,
30,
(Jan.
Calculations, Hous. CHRON.
Change in DNA
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-leading-massive-

review-of-criminal-cases-6796205.php; Hall, supra note 46, at 153-54.
251

TEX. FORENSIC SC. COMM'N, CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE TERM "CURRENT AND PROPER

MIXTURE

INTERPRETATION

PROTOCOLS"

http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/Clarification%20on%20current%20and%
Omixture%20interpetation%20protocols.pdf.
Id.
252
253

Id.

254

See Banks, supranote 250.

255

Id.

256

Id.

257

Id.
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new guidance promulgated regarding testing and reporting protocols for DNA
mixtures., 258 According to Barry Scheck of the national Innocence Project, these
efforts earned Texas the distinction of being the first-and, as of early 2016, the
only-state to deal with this enormous issue in a systematic and proactive
fashion.259
V.

CONCLUSION

Challenges surely remain, but the creation of an infrastructure of forensic
science has already vastly improved the quality of forensic evidence in the state.
Texas has produced the largest number of exonerations of any state.26 ° While
sobering, the volume of exonerations also reflects the outstanding progress the
state has made in developing the resources necessary to uncover and correct past
injustices. From post-conviction prosecutorial discovery, to the appointment of
specialized habeas counsel, to the junk science writ and stakeholder cooperation
and training, the state has put into place many of the necessary elements for
righting the wrongs of the past on a large-scale, statewide basis.
The significant role of the Texas Forensic Science Commission also
cannot be overstated. The Commission has not only been integral to
implementing statewide systemic reviews of convictions involving flawed
science, but it has also elevated the level of forensic science practice in crime
laboratories statewide through accreditation, licensing, training, and
investigations of irregularities and malfeasance. 261 The Commission's leadership
in declaring certain types of evidence to be insufficiently reliable for use in court,
as occurred recently with bite-mark evidence, 62 has also improved
administration ofjustice in the criminal courts.
Other groups and innovations have also contributed to the overall
process of improvement. The Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit organizes
training programs to implement the needed changes in how forensic science
intersects with the legal system, and the group also facilitates stakeholder
meetings on particular issues of concern.263 Local innovations such as conviction
integrity units within District Attorney's Offices produce another important

E-mail from Jim Bethke, Exec. Dir., Tex. Indigent Def. Comm'n, to Professor Sandra
Guerra Thompson (Aug. 11, 2016) (on file with authors).
259
Id.
258

260

See

Exonerations

by

State,

NAT'L

REGISTRY

OF

EXONERATIONS,

https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-StatesMap.aspx (last updated Oct. 13, 2016). These numbers grew dramatically in the wake of the
discovery of wrongful guilty pleas in drug cases. See supra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
261
See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
262
See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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source of expertise and proactive problem-solving.2 64 Finally, Houston has taken
the lead by transforming its troubled crime lab into one that is independent of
law enforcement, transparent in its operation, and excellent in its quality
assurance and efficiency. 265 The result is a synergistic relationship in which
stakeholders work collaboratively toward the common goals of uncovering
wrongful convictions, as well as preventing new ones.
This synergy also makes it feasible for the legislature to begin another
round of reforms by forming yet another stakeholder group to study wrongful
convictions. Most recently, the legislature established the Timothy Cole
Exoneration Review Commission ("TCERC"), a second group named for
exoneree Timothy Cole. 266 It began work in 2015, and plans to re-examine what
else can be done to improve forensic science, along with other causes of wrongful
convictions.267
All the judicial training programs and stakeholder meetings appear to
have made the judiciary more receptive to prisoner petitions challenging forensic
evidence. In June 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals postponed the impending
execution of a man convicted in the death of his two-year-old daughter. 268 The
conviction and death sentence largely rested on evidence of "[s]haken [b]aby
[s]yndrome. 269
In this manner, Texas has created a continuing cycle of legislativelycreated stakeholder collaboration leading to state and local innovations and the
development of expertise, leading to calls for greater reforms and more
stakeholder collaboration. This process has brought about many fundamental

264

See Noah Fromson, Conviction Integrity Units Expand Beyond Lone Star State Roots, TEX.

TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/03/12/conviction-integrityunits-expand-beyond-texas-roo/.
265
See supra notes 189-224 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text. The TCERC is made up of 11 members,
266
including 4 legislators, a gubernatorial appointee, and representatives of various criminal justice
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statutory and local reforms in the practice of forensic science, and governing its
use in court.
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